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The Reaction of the State Courts to
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
Erik L. Collins*
J. Douglas Drushal**
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court invited the states to
establish their own standards of liability for defamation of privatepersons,
so long as these standards did not fall below a federal constitutional
minimum. The authors focus on how state courts have responded to this
invitation, both in establishingstandardsof careforpublishersor broadcasters of defamatory matter and in addressinga series of questions left unanswered by Gertz.

FOR OVER A DECADE the Supreme Court of the United States has
struggled to find a proper accommodation between the law of
defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the first
amendment.I In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,2 the Court redefined
federal constitutional limitations so that in cases involving private
individuals, states would have considerable latitude in setting standards for liability: "We hold that, so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood[s] injurious to a private individual." 3 While it would be permissible for state legislatures to adopt such a standard by statute, to
date only state courts have accepted the Court's invitation. This article
will analyze the most significant state court decisions 4 and present the
varied standards of liability that have emerged. Special attention will
also be given to a series of questions raised by Gertz, but left unanswered in the Court's opinion. But first it is necessary to briefly
5
examine the Gertz opinion and the issues raised therein.
* B.A. (1965), M.A. (1966), Florida State University; Ph.D. (1972), Syracuse
University; J.D. (1977), Ohio State University. The co-author is an Assistant Professor
of Journalism at Ohio State University.
** B.A. (1974), Northwestern University; J.D. (1977), Ohio State University. The
co-author is law clerk for The Honorable Anthony J. Celebrezze, Judge, United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. He is admitted to the Ohio Bar.
1. E.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing
Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
3. Id. at 347 (footnote omitted).
4. This article covers reported cases available as of November 1, 1977.
5. This article does not purport to evaluate the merits of Gertz, but rather accepts
Gertz as a starting point for analysis. For two perspectives on the merits of Gertz,
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I.

GERTZ V. ROBERT WELCH, INC.

A.

Background

Elmer Gertz was a Chicago attorney who was engaged to represent
the family of a youth who had been killed by a Chicago police officer
in 1968.6 The wrongful death action arising out of the incident, along
with other matters, received a good deal of publicity, including some
which portrayed Gertz in a less than favorable light. In particular,
American Opinion, the organ of the John Birch Society, falsely
accused Gertz of having framed the police officer who killed the
youth, of having an extensive criminal record, and of being an official
in Marxist-Leninist organizations. Gertz brought a libel action in
federal district court against Robert Welch, Inc., publisher of American Opinion. A jury trial resulted in a $50,000 award for Gertz, but it
was set aside by the trial court and judgment was entered for the

defendant. 7 Notwithstanding Gertz' status as a private figure,' the trial
court applied the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan9 because the alleged libel involved a matter of public
concern. In the view of the trial judge, Gertz had not met the strict 10
New York Times test because he had only shown that the defendants
acted negligently.11 On appeal the court of appeals affirmed, 12 Its
holding was based upon the intervening decision of the Supreme Court
in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 13 in which a plurality held that
compare Robertson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1976), with Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422 (1975).
6. For the facts of Gertz, see 418 U.S. at 325-32.
7. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Il1.1970), aff'd, 471 F.2d
801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. 322 F. Supp. at 998-99.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York Times standard requires a public official to
show that the defendant had acted with "actual malice," that is, that the defendant acted
"with knowledge that [the defamatory matter] was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was true or not." 376 U.S. at 279-80. The plaintiff must show this by
"convincing clarity." Id. at 285-86. This standard was extended to "public figures."
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
For a review of the constitutionalization of the law of defamation, see Eaton,
American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An
Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975).
10. Whether a standard is strict or loose depends on one's position in a lawsuit. The
term "strict" is used in this article to mean that proof of the plaintiff's case is more
difficult. References to "looser" standards will similarly refer to the plaintiff's burden
of proof. These terms are defined vis-4-vis the plaintiff for convenience.
11. 322 F. Supp. at 999.
12. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972).
13. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
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the New York Times standard should be applied to all matters of public
interest or concern regardless of the plaintiff's status. 4 The court of
appeals questioned the district court's conclusion that Gertz was a
private figure,' 5 but it left the issue unresolved, finding that New York
Times applied, and that Gertz had failed to meet its requirements.
B.

The Supreme Court Opinion

In an attempt to work an accommodation between state defamation
laws and first amendment freedoms of speech and press, the Supreme
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. 16 The Court agreed with the trial
judge's finding that Gertz was a private figure. 17 Thus, the central
issue became "whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes
defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public
official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against
liability for the injury inflicted by those statements.' 18 This was
essentially the same issue that had divided the court in Rosenbloom. 19
In Gertz, however, the Court explicitly rejected the subject matter
analysis of Rosenbloom,20 adopting instead a test which focused exclusively on the status of the plaintiff. 2 ' Under the Court's analysis, the
"private" plaintiff is subject to a different standard from the "public"
22
plaintiff, regardless of the subject matter of the alleged libel.
This approach was seen as a better way to strike a balance between
the countervailing interests of freedom of speech and a free press, on
the one hand, and the states' interest in compensating private individuals for harm from defamatory falsehoods, on the other. 23 The subject
matter test of Rosenbloom was rejected because it would unduly
burden the interests of the states in protecting their citizens. 24 Rosen14. Id. at 43-48. The plurality opinion in Rosenbloom established the proposition
that the strict New York Times standard must be met by a plaintiff regardless of his
status as a public official, public figure, or private figure, whenever the subject matter of
the alleged defamation libel involves "matters of public or general concern." Id. at
44-45.
15. 471 F.2d at 805.
16. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
17. Compare 418 U.S. at 351-52 with 322 F. Supp. at 998-99. This aspect of the
decision was itself disputed, given that Gertz had "long been active in community and
professional affairs, . . . published several books and articles . . . [and] was consequently well-known in some circles." 418 U.S. at 351.
18. 418 U.S. at 332.
19. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1971).
20. See note 14 supra.
21. 418 U.S. at 342-46.
22. Id. at 343.
23. Id. at 341-46.
24. Id. at 346.
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bloom was also criticized for forcing the judiciary "to decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public
interest' and which do not-to determine . . . 'what information is
relevant to self-government.' "25 The Court doubted "the wisdom of
committing this task to the conscience of judges.'"26
The Court justified its position by noting distinctions between
private persons and public officials or public figures.2 7 First, private
persons cannot gain access to the media as easily as public persons and
are thus unable to counteract defamation by "self-help." This renders
private persons more vulnerable to injury than public persons. 28 Second, private persons have not accepted the consequences of public
notoriety to the same extent as public officials and public figures. The
latter are deemed to have assumed the risk of being subjected to certain
levels of defamatory falsehoods concerning their activities. They are
consequently less deserving of protection than private persons. 29 While
the Court realized that these propositions might not hold true in every
case, 30 it concluded that a general rule was essential in order to guide
31
the media in their coverage of both private and public persons.
For the above reasons, the Court retreated from Rosenbloom and
concluded that "the States should retain substantial latitude in their
efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood[s] injurious to
the reputation of a private individual.' '32 It therefore established a
constitutional minimum below which the states may not fall, in order
to ensure that first amendment concerns are respected:
We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without
fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood[s] injurious to a private individual. This
approach provides a more equitable boundary between the
competing concerns involved here. It recognizes the strength
of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the
press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability
33
for defamation.
25. Id. (quoting from Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)).
26. 418 U.S. at 346.

27. Id. at 344-45.
28. Id. at 344.
29. Id. at 344-45.
30. Identical arguments were raised by the plaintiff, and were rejected by the Court

in Rosenbloom. 403 U.S. at 45-48.
31. 418 U.S. at 343-44.
32. Id. at 345-46.
33. Id. at 347-48 (footnote omitted).
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Yet, a state's countervailing interest in compensating a defamed plaintiff extends only to recovery for "actual injury." Therefore, the Court conditioned the recovery of presumed or punitive
damages upon a showing of New York Times "actual malice." 34 This
damage limitation is a substantial modification of the common law,
which permits recovery of damages without proof of actual loss because injury is presumed to flow from the very fact of publication. 35 It
provides little room for experimentation on the part of the states,
however, and therefore will not be subjected to close scrutiny in this
article.

36

The primary question remaining after Gertz is what standard of
care will be adopted in response to the Court's invitation to the states to
develop their own rules. 37 This question is considered in Part II of this
article. Other questions raised by Gertz, which are not necessarily left
to the states to resolve, are simply left unanswered by the Court's
opinion: Is the holding of Gertz limited to media defendants 38 or is it
applicable to all defamation defendants? Does Gertz apply only to
libel or to all forms of defamation? Is Gertz limited to cases in which
the subject matter of the libel is a matter of public or general interest or
concern? What standard of proof must a plaintiff meet, under the local
34. Id. at 350. The Court in Gertz feared that the "uncontrolled discretion of juries
to award damages" where no loss was actually proven could lead to unpredictability and
disparity in damage awards and to the selective punishment of the expression of unpopular views. Id. at 349-50. The Court did, however, define "actual injury" rather broadly
to include "impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering." Id. at 350.
35. Id. at 349-50. See note 9 supra.
36. While most state courts have simply followed the outlines of Gertz on damage
limitations, some have gone further and held that punitive damages may never be
recovered against a media defendant. E.g., Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,
330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (Mass. 1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439,
447, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976). This prohibition is apparently based upon the belief that first
amendment concerns outweigh any countervailing state interest which would permit the
recovery of damages in excess of those actually incurred.
37. While the majority in Gertz went no further than to proscribe "liability without
fault," there is language in the case which contemplates the adoption of a negligence
standard. See 418 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 354-55 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 366-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
id. at 375-76, 392 (White, J., dissenting).
38. This article uses "media defendant" to mean a journalistic defendant, and "nonmedia defendant" to refer to a non-journalistic defendant. Since the defendants in Gertz
and in the reported State court decisions following Gertz have been media journalists
(see cases cited in notes 135-36 infra), neither the Supreme Court nor the state courts
have been forced to distinguish between journalistic and non-journalistic media defendants. It should be noted, however, that substantially different considerations may be
involved where the defendant is an entertainment medium, rather than a journalist.
Anderson, supra note 5, at 424 n.18.
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standard of care? Has falsity become an element of the plaintiff's case?
How have state defamation statutes been affected by Gertz? To the
limited extent that state courts have addressed these collateral issues,
Part HI of this article will present and analyze their responses.
II.

STANDARDS OF CARE ADOPTED BY THE STATES

A.
1.

Negligence

Common Law Negligence

While Gertz provided that a negligence standard would pass
constitutional muster in suits by private persons against media defendants, even in areas of general or public interest, the Court made little
attempt to spell out specific guidelines as to how negligence should be
defined or employed by the states choosing this standard. Historically,
the concept of negligence in tort law has involved an injured plaintiff
whose injury was caused by a defendant's breach of a duty of care owed
to the plaintiff. 39 Ordinarily, the standard of conduct is characterized
as "reasonable care under like circumstances," 40 and the burden of
proof is usually on the plaintiff to show the lack of reasonable care by a
41
preponderance of the evidence.
2.

Restatement (Second) of Torts

The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts responded to
Gertz by adopting the following standard of liability for a media
defendant who has defamed a private person (or a public person in a
matter unrelated to his public capacity):
One who publishes a false and defamatory communication
concerning a private person, or concerning a public official
or public figure in relation to a purely private matter not
affecting his conduct, fitness or role in his public capacity, is
subject to liability, if, but only if, he
(a) knows that the statement is false and that it defames
the other,
(b) acts in reckless disregard of these matters, or
(c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them. 42
Thus, a defendant who is a "professional disseminator of news," or a
reporter, is liable under subsection (c) if he negligently publishes false
and defamatory information about a private person or a public person
39.
40.
41.
42.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).
Id. § 32, at 151.
Id. § 38, at 208-09.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977). The drafters of the Restate-

ment have acknowledged the influence of Gertz on § 580B in Comment c(1) to that
section.
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in his private capacity.4 3 The defendant is held "to the skill and
experience normally possessed by members of [his] profession.'" 44
The defendant is not deemed to have acted negligently if he "acted
reasonably in checking the truth or falsity or defamatory character of
the communication before publishing it." 4 5
The Restatement suggests a number of factors and attendant questions which a state court or legislature should consider when implementing a negligence standard. The first of these concerns is the
timeliness of the news story: "Was the communication a matter of
topical news requiring prompt publication to be useful, or was it one in
which time and opportunity were freely available to investigate? In the
latter situation, due care may require a more thorough investigation. "6 A second factor concerns the degree of legitimate public or
private interest in the subject matter which the defendant was attempting to promote in publishing the information:
Informing the public as to a matter of public concern is an
important interest in a democracy; spreading of mere gossip
is of less importance. How necessary was this communication to these recipients in order to protect the interest involved? If there was no substantial interest to protect in
publishing the communication to these recipients, then a
reasonable person would be hesitant to publish the communication unless he had good reason to believe that it was
accurate. 47
The third factor involves
the extent of the damage to the plaintiff's reputation or the
injury to his sensibilities which would be produced if the
communication proves to be false. Was the communication
defamatory on its face? Would its defamatory connotation
be known only to a few? How extensive was the dissemination? How easily might the plaintiff protect his reputation by
means at his own disposal? 48
3.

States Adopting a Negligence Standard
The first state courts to respond to Gertz adopted standards that
approximated the "matter of public interest or concern" test announced in Rosenbloom.49 In these jurisdictions, some private plain43. Id. at Comment g. The drafters of the Restatement, however, doubted that
Gertz was limited to media defendants. Id. at Comment e.

44. Id. at Comment g.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id. at Comment h.
Id.
Id.
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied,
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tiffs must meet stricter tests than others. 50 The tide has shifted, however, and the majority of states which have considered the issue have
opted for some form of a negligence standard, 51 with a few states
423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications,
Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975).
For a discussion of these cases, see notes 95-121 infra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 95-121 infra and accompanying text.
51. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216(1977); Cahill
v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Troman v. Wood,
62 Il. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531
P.2d 76 (1975); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); Stone v.
Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975); Thomas H. Maloney &
Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976);
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
In Peagleran automobile dealer and his dealership alleged defamation by a newspaper's reporting of Better Business Bureau complaints.
Cahill involved a radio broadcast identifying the plaintiff and his family as left-wing
sympathizers and implying that each family member was "disloyal to his country and
was a Communist or a Communist sympathizer." 56 Haw. at 525, 543 P.2d at 1359-60.
The alleged defamation occurred during a discussion of the plaintiff's opposition to the
Honolulu mayor's call for stiff sentences for criminals.
In Troman the defendant published in the Chicago Sun-Times a photograph of the
plaintiff's house along with a story about youth gangs terrorizing a suburban area of
Chicago. The caption for the photo implied that one of the gang leaders lived in the house
and that it served as headquarters for the gang.
Gobin involved the publication in the Dodge City Daily Globe of erroneous information received from the county attorney which stated that the plaintiff had pleaded guilty
to cruelty to animals arising out of an alleged incident of pig starvation. In fact, the
plaintiff had not pleaded guilty to such a charge. The Supreme Court of Kansas applied a
negligence standard of care to the allegedly erroneous reporting of judicial proceedings.
Jacron involved a slander action by a private plaintiff against his former employer. In
a telephone conversation with the plaintiff's current employer, the defendant implied
that the plaintiff had stolen merchandise from the defendant. The implication was false
to the extent that the merchandise was in fact the subject of a bona fide dispute between
the plaintiff and the defendant.
In Stone, an experienced ne%spaper reporter, misinterpreting an arraignment for the
possession of a dangerous drug, erroneously identified the plaintiff as the accused. A
news editor, who knew the plaintiff and who was surprised by the report, printed the
story without further confirmation.
In Maloney a newspaper defended a suit based on a report that the plaintiff demolition corporation admitted demolishing the wrong building and that the plaintiff had been
adjudged liable for a specific damage award. Whether plaintiff's status as a private or a
public person was influenced by its status as a corporation was not addressed in the
court's opinion. For a discussion of a case in which a corporation's status was determinative in holding it to be a public person, see note 121 infra.
In Martin the owner of a pet shop brought an action in libel and slander against a
television station. The problem arose from four broadcasts in which the defendant's
newsman charged the plaintiff with the mistreatment of animals and the sale of an animal
to a person who alleged to have already owned the animal. The charges were subsequently found to be false.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:306

apparently awaiting only the appropriate case in which to do so. 5 2
In Foster the plaintiff was a licensed civil engineer and surveyor who also served as
the elected county surveyor. As a purely private consultant he was hired to investigate a
flooding problem in a suburb of Laredo, Texas. The Laredo Times investigated the
flooding problem and, in so doing, erroneously reported that the plaintiff had platted the
flooded section. Plaintiff also complained that the report made it appear that he was
engaged in activity constituting a conflict of interest. The Supreme Court of Texas found
that the plaintiff was a public official but that the statements in question were not related
to his official conduct.
In Taskett an advertising executive was compelled to file for the dissolution of his
corporation because its debts greatly exceeded its assets. Pending the outcome of the
dissolution the executive vacationed in Mexico, and, because of a misunderstanding,
failed to pay the corporation's office rent. The defendant television station reported that
the plaintiff had fraudulently converted corporate funds to his personal use and implied
that he had left town in an attempt to defraud his creditors.
For a discussion of the rationales supporting the adoption of a negligence standard in
these cases, see notes 55-94 infra and accompanying text.
52. Perhaps the most prominent state court defamation suit in which Gertz played an
important role, but in which no standards of liability were clearly established, was
Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974), vacated and remanded, 424 U.S. 448
(1976). The plaintiff, the socially prominent wife of the scion of a wealthy family,
sued her husband for separate maintenance. Mr. Firestone counter-sued for divorce,
charging his wife with adultery and extreme cruelty. In granting the divorce, the trial
court awarded Mrs. Firestone substantial alimony. Time magazine, erroneously believing that the trial court had found Mrs. Firestone guilty of adultery, published a small
news item to that effect. Florida law is clear that a party found guilty of adultery cannot
be awarded alimony.
The Supreme Court of Florida found that the published remarks were both untrue
and libelous and upheld a jury verdict for Mrs. Firestone. 305 So. 2d at 178. As the court
had noted in a prior opinion in the same case, Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745, 747
(Fla. 1972), quashing and remanding Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386 (Fla. App.
1971), libel per se is actionable unless absolutely privileged. 305 So.2d at 177. Under
Florida law the publication of a judicial proceeding constitutes a qualified privilege, but
only if it is fair, impartial, and accurate as to all material matters. Id. (citing Shiell v.
Metropolis Co., 102 Fla. 794, 136 So. 537 (1931)). Given the court's finding that the news
item in Time was inaccurate, id. at 177-78, the qualified privilege was inapplicable, and
Time, Inc. would appear to have been absolutely liable in direct contravention of the
constitutional limitation enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Gertz.
See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
The Supreme Court of Florida apparently did not recognize this conflict with Gertz,
for it cited Gertz with approval in holding that "this erroneous reporting is clear and
convincing evidence of the negligence in certain segments of the news media in gathering
the news." Id. at 178. One might argue that with this holding the court adopted a
negligence standard for private plaintiffs. But in its prior opinion in Firestone the
court had taken great pains to point out that its decision was based in large measure on
the separate maintenance-divorce proceeding not being a matter of public interest or
concern. 271 So. 2d at 747-52, quoted in 305 So. 2d at 175. In its later opinion the court
made no express finding that a negligence standard was being adopted via Gertz. 305 So.
2d at 176-78.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld the finding of the Supreme Court of
Florida that the separate maintenance-divorce proceeding was not a matter of public
interest or concern and that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure. 424 U.S. 448, 453-57.
It remanded the case on the issue of fault, however, indicating that it could not determine
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State courts choosing a negligence standard have typically adopted
the language of Gertz or have paraphrased its holding. For example,
the Supreme Court of Illinois has held:
[I]n a suit brought by a private individual to recover actual
damages for a defamatory publication whose substantial
danger to reputation is apparent, recovery may be had upon
proof that the publication was false, and that the defendant
either knew it to be false, or, believing it to be true, lacked
reasonable grounds for that belief. . . . [N]egligence may
form the basis of liability regardless of whether or not the
publication53in question related to a matter of public or general interest.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Washington has held:
[A] private individual, who is neither a public figure nor
official, may recover actual damages for a defamatory falsehood, concerning a subject of general or public interest,
where the substance makes substantial dangers to reputation
apparent, on a showing that in publishing the statement, the
defendant knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care,
should have known that the statement was false, or
would
54
create a false impression in some material respect.
whether the Florida court had adopted a negligence standard and, if it had, whether
negligence had been satisfactorily demonstrated. Id. at 464-64.
Connecticut is a state that has apparently adopted a negligence standard without
expressly doing so. In Corbett v. Register Publishing Co., 356 A.2d 472 (Super.Ct. Conn.
1975), a family sued the local newspaper for alleged defamation resulting from a story
which had incorrectly identified the husband as the father of a youth who had been
arrested in connection with unruly juvenile behavior. The Superior Court of Connecticut
held that the plaintiffs would have to demonstrate malice-in-fact but equated malice-infact with a "failure to make a reasonably careful investigation of the facts before
publication." Id. at 475 (quoting Osborne v. Troup, 60 Conn. 475, 493 (1891)). The court
added: "Judicial gloss seems to have diluted [malice-in-fact] to misconduct amounting essentially to negligence." 356 A.2d at 475.
The Connecticut court viewed the claims of two of the three family members as
having been "rescued by Gertz" from the rigorous New York Times standard of liability,
which, prior to Gertz, Connecticut courts had felt compelled to follow. 356 A.2d at 477
(quoting Moriarty v. Lippe, 162 Conn. 371, 294 A.2d 326 (1972)). Since Gertz had
removed this compulsion, the court found it logical to apply pre-New York Times law in
defamation suits by private plaintiffs against media defendants. 356 A.2d at 477. Therefore, with regard to two of the family members the court required a trial on the merits to
determine whether the defendant had acted negligently-the affidavits which had been
filed did not preclude a finding of some degree of fault on the part of the defendant and
Gertz' constitutional minimum of no media liability without fault was not violated. Id.
53. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975). Note that
"substantial danger to reputation" may mean that in Illinois (and perhaps other states)
libel will be limited to the old per se definition, excluding much of what has been
traditionally defined as libel per quod. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS
372-73 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 39, § 112, at 762--64.
54. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976).
For an additional example, see Thomas H: Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co.,
43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 110, 334 N.E.2d 494,498 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
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While the rationales advanced by state courts in adopting negligence standards vary, several appear in many, if not all, of the
decisions. One of the most common is that reputational interests
command constitutional protection. This is raised in jurisdictions
where the state constitution, unlike its federal counterpart, expressly
refers to the protection of reputation.
For example, the Supreme Court of Illinois read such a passage in
its state constitution 55 as an indication of Illinois' traditional concern to
provide its defamed citizens with a right to redress in the state's
courts. 56 A limitation on this right would prevent defamed plaintiffs
from preserving and restoring their reputations through an authoritative
and public determination that an injurious statement about them is in
fact false.57 Therefore, the court found that the Illinois Constitution
offered no support for the adoption of an "actual malice" standard and
instead chose to adopt a negligence standard. 58 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Kansas read the Kansas Constitution to protect the reputations
of the state's citizens, to provide them with an adequate remedy at law
for injury to reputation, and to render the media liable for injury
59
resulting from abuses.
Closely related to the state constitutional rationale is the argument
noted in a number of decisions that nothing in state public policy or
prior decisions requires the adoption of a standard stricter than the
negligence standard permitted by Gertz. Typical of this approach is the
opinion of the Supreme Court of Washington in Taskett v. King
BroadcastingCo. 6° Prior to New York Times, Washington courts had
55. "All persons may speak, write and publish freely, being responsible for the
abuse of that liberty. In trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the truth, when published
with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient defense." ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 4.
"Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs
which he receives to his person, privacy, property or reputation. He shall obtain justice
by law, freely, completely, and promptly." Id. § 12.
56. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 194-95, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1975).
57. Id. at 195, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
58. Id. at 198-99, 340 N.E.2d at 299. The New York Times "actual malice" standard, of course, does not deny redress; it simply makes redress more difficult to attain.
As a practical matter this added difficulty is often insurmountable.
In Troman, the Supreme Court of Illinois distinguished Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976), in which the Court of Appeals of Indiana, on the basis of
language in article I, section 9 of the Indiana Constitution, see note 113 infra, chose to
follow Rosenbloom and adopt-the New York Times standard where the defamed plaintiff
is a private person but the subject matter of the defamation is one of public or general
interest. 62 11.2d at 199, 340 N.E.2d at 299; see notes 113-114 infra and accompanying
text.
59. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232, 531 P.2d 76, 83 (1975).
60. 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
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held that common law malice was not a requirement in defamation
actions.6 1 Therefore, the court in Taskett thought that it would be
totally consistent to adopt a standard closer to that in force before New
York Times yet still permitted by Gertz-a negligence standard. 62
Although the court recognized that the first amendment was designed
to protect the marketplace of ideas, it concluded that first amendment
protections did not extend to "the intentional lie" or the "careless
63
error."
A third rationale borrows from the reasoning in Gertz.64 According
to this rationale, standards stricter than negligence would impose too
great a burden on the private plaintiff65 because in modem society the
66
private person is especially deserving of protection for his reputation.
Any chilling effect on the media which may result from a negligence
standard has been deemed to be more than offset by a state's interest in
protecting the reputation of a private person and compensating him for
injury from defamation.67 Private persons as a class do not seek public
scrutiny and comment 68 and do not generally have access to the media
by which they are able to combat attacks on their reputations. 69 The
courts espousing this rationale are unimpressed by the argument that a
negligence standard will result in media self-censorship, 70 and view
61. Id. at 444,546 P.2d at 84 (quoting Purvis v. Bremer's, Inc., 54 Wash. 2d 743,755,
344 P.2d 705, 712 (1959)); accord, Pitts v. Spokane Chronicle Co., 63 Wash. 2d 763,388
P.2d 976 (1964); Luna de la Peunte v. Seattle Times Co., 186 Wash. 618, 59 P.2d 753
(1936); Wilson v. Sun Publishing Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P.2d 774 (1915).
62. 86 Wash. 2d at 445, 546 P.2d at 85; accord, Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park
Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 534-35, 543 P.2d 1356, 1365 (1975) (adopting a negligence standard
because it could find no overriding policy reason for affording the media the protection
of a stricter standard).
63. 86 Wash. 2d at 444,546 P.2d at 84 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 340 (1974)); accord, Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223,232, 531 P.2d 76,
83 (1975) (reasoning that the media, like other members of the public, should be held
accountable for their negligent acts and that negligence may oftentimes cause as severe
an injury as actual malice).
64. See 418 U.S. at 341-46.
65. E.g., Troman v. Wood, 62111.2d 184, 195,340 N.E.2d 292,297 (1975); Taskett v.
King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 444, 546 P.2d 81, 84 (1976).
66. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
67. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 446, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976).
68. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 169 (Mass. 1975);
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445-46, 546 P.2d
81, 85 (1976).
69. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445,546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976)
(quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974); Tilton v. Coates
Publishing Co., 76 Wash. 2d 707, 714, 459 P.2d 8, 12 (1969)).
70. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 447, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976);
see Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232-33, 531 P.2d 76, 83-84 (1975);
Foster v. Laredo Newspaper, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 ('rex. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977).
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negligence as an acceptable burden for the press to bear. 7 1 Therefore,
as the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has stated, "[a] reasonable balance
between the rights of the news media and the rights of the private
72
individual is best achieved by the negligence test."
A fourth reason for the adoption of a negligence standard has been
an express distaste for the Rosenbloom alternative. For example, the
Supreme Court of Illinois viewed Rosenbloom's "public or general
interest" test 73 as impermissibly blurring the distinction between public and private persons and as requiring state courts to assess on an ad
hoc basis whether or not the subject matter of the defamation was a
74
matter of public or general interest.
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii rejected Rosenbloom,
refusing to accept the notion that a negligence standard would inhibit
free expression. 75 The court foresaw only problems if a subject matter
test were applied to claims by private individuals; recovery could be
denied not only on showings of "highly unreasonable conduct," but
even where the defendant had been shown to possess a "bad or corrupt
76
motive."
A fifth commonly expressed rationale is that too much power is
placed in the hands of the media by either a subject matter test or by a
standard of liability stricter than negligence. For example, in Troman
v. Wood77 the Supreme Court of Illinois found that a subject matter
test would be improper because it would rest in part on what the media
believed was news. 78 Similar feelings were echoed by the Supreme
Court of Texas regarding the "actual malice" test:
The shortcomings of the New York Times standard are widely recognized. . . . "[S]uch a test puts a premium on ignorance, encourages the irresponsible publisher not to inquire,
and permits the issue to be determined by the defendant's
testimony that he published the statement
in good faith and
79
unaware of its probable falsity."
71. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 232-33, 531 P.2d 76, 83-84(1975);

see Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 447, 546 P.2d 81, 86 (1976).
72. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976).
73. See note 14 supra.
74. Troman v. Wood, 62 11. 2d 184, 195-96, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297-98 (1975); see text
accompanying notes 21-26 supra.
75. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 536, 543 P.2d 1356, 1366

(1975).
76. Id. at 535-36 & n.6, 543 P.2d at 1365-66 & n.6.
77. 62 I1. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
78. Id. at 196, 340 N.E.2d at 297.
79. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977) (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731 (1968)).
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"Modified" Negligence Standards

Where courts have rejected Rosenbloom, media defendants have
often argued that private plaintiffs should be required to overcome an
"intermediate" standard. 80 These efforts have been generally unsuccessful. The Supreme Court of Illinois, for example, quickly dismissed
three such arguments advanced by a defendant newspaper. In Troman
v. Wood, 81 the defendant first argued that under a negligence test the
jury would confuse falsity with whether the defendant had made a
proper (non-negligent) investigation. 82 The court responded that the
trial judge could overcome this problem by giving adequate instructions.8 3 Second, the defendant argued that if a negligence standard
were necessary to ensure adequate state protection of reputational
interests, then the standard should be "gross negligence" or "willful
and wanton misconduct" to ensure adequate state protection of free
expression. 4 The Illinois court rejected this argument out of hand,
refusing to further complicate the law of defamation. 85 The Supreme
Court of Texas, faced with a similar argument, responded that distinctions between negligence and gross negligence or irresponsible
conduct are not clear and that" [l]imitations upon the right of recovery
. . . deemed necessary to protect publishers and broadcasters from an
unreasonable degree of liability will undoubtedly be adopted by the
courts regardless which label is used.''86
The final argument raised by the defendant in Troman was that
some form of "journalistic malpractice" should serve as the yardstick
for negligent conduct by the media. 87 The Illinois court rejected this
concept, stating that it would make newspaper practice in the community the controlling standard, and if there were only one newspaper in
the community, then that paper would be able to set its own standard
88
for negligence.
In contrast to Troman, the Supreme Court of Kansas adopted just
such a "journalistic malpractice" test: "[T]he standard to be applied
in determining such negligence is the conduct of the reasonably careful
publisher or broadcaster in the community or in similar communities
80. E.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 I11. 2d 184, 197, 346 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1975).
81. 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).

82. Id. at 197, 340 N.E.2d at 298.
83. Id.
84.
85.
86.
denied,
87,
88.

Id.
Id.
Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert.
429 U.S. 1123 (1977).
62 I1. 2d at 197-98, 340 N.E.2d at 298-99.
Id. at 198, 340 N.E.2d at 299.
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under the existing circumstances .
"...
89 The Kansas court apparently did not foresee any difficulties in holding the offending medium
to the standards of its neighbors, despite the apparent likelihood of a
single newspaper or broadcast station serving a given Kansas community. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that under a
negligence standard ordinary care "is that level of care which ordinarily prudent persons engaged in the same business would usually exer9
cise under similar circumstances.' "
5.

Conclusion
A review of the decisions in which state courts have adopted
negligence standards indicates that for a variety of reasons the courts
have not taken full advantage of the opportunity given to them by the
Supreme Court in Gertz. The state courts do not seem to be analyzing
the issues critically or exploring all the alternatives when these new
standards are adopted. For example, a number of courts do not appear
to have even considered the possibility of adopting standards stricter
than negligence but less strict than New York Times "actual
malice." 9 1 Additionally, there often is little evidence to indicate that
the courts have investigated the problems connected with the adoption
of a negligence standard before choosing it as the standard for their
92

states.

To date, only one state court decision has addressed with any
completeness the myriad of issues raised by Gertz. 93 Most courts have
examined only the issues surrounding the adoption of a fault standard. 94 Particularly for those courts seeking more lenient negligence
89. Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 233, 531 P.2d 76, 84 (1975).
90. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 92 (Okla. 1976) (citing Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Kennard, 199 Okla. 1, 4, 181 P.2d 234, 238 (1947)).
There are'other indications that courts have been sensitive to media interests in postGertz cases. The highest courts in Massachusetts and Washington have accepted the
argument that punitive damages should not be awarded to any defamation plaintiff.
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161, 164 (Mass. 1975); Taskett v.
King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85-86 (1976).
91. E.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); Taskett
v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976). But see Troman v.
Wood, 62 I11.
2d 184, 197, 340 N.E.2d 292, 298 (1975); Chapadeau v. Utica ObserverDispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); Foster v.
Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123
(1977).
92. This could be as much the fault of attorneys representing media defendants as it
is the fault of the courts.
93. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); see notes 139-51
infra and accompanying text.
94. E.g., Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216(1977);
Troman v. Wood, 62 I11.
2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Taskett v. King Broadcasting
Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
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standards that do not unduly infringe on first amendment rights, there
is a need to carefully consider such issues as how negligence is to be
determined and whether the test will encompass more than ordinary
negligence as defined by general tort law. This is not meant as a
criticism of the negligence standard itself, but rather expresses a
disappointment with the lack of precision attending the adoption of the
negligence standard.
B.

Reversion to Rosenbloom

Even though most jurisdictions have responded to Gertz by adopting a negligence standard in all defamation cases involving private
plaintiffs, some have not. The minority jurisdictions have preserved the
Rosenbloom rule, 95 or some approximation of it. Two of the earliest
cases started an apparent trend toward refusing to adopt the negligence
test contemplated by Gertz.96 These cases were Aafco Heating & Air
Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 97 decided six
months after Gertz, and Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,98
decided nine months after Gertz. In Aafco, the Indiana Court of
Appeals did not articulate a particular standard but noted that it could
choose "either a Gertz or Rosenbloom conceptualized privilege. "99 It
chose the latter. 100 In Walker, the Supreme Court of Colorado was
more specific:
[W]hen a defamatory statement has been published concerning one who is not a public official or a public figure, but the
matter involved is of public or general concern, the publisher
of the statement will be liable to the person defamed if, and
only if, he knew the statement to be false or made the
statement with reckless disregard for whether it was true or
not.'01
95. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
96. See note 37 supra.
97. 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976). In Aafco, a
series of newspaper stories were written about an electrical fire which had caused the
deaths of two small children. The stories also reported that the plaintiff had failed to
obtain a permit for a furnace installation at the children's residence three weeks prior to
the fire. The plaintiff sued for libel, contending that a fire inspector's report repudiated
any claim that the plaintiff was responsible for the blaze.
98. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). Walker involved
newspaper articles and letters to the editor in the ColoradoSprings Sun accusing antique
dealers of dealing in stolen goods and refusing to return stolen property to its rightful
owner. For a discussion of Walker, see 36 Outo ST. L.J. 929 (1975).
99. 321 N.E.2d at 585.

100. Id. at 585-90.
101. 188 Colo. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457. The court did qualify Rosenbloom (see notes
9, 13-14 supra and accompanying text) by adopting a unique definition of "reckless
disregard." Rosenbloom had incorporated the definition of reckless disregard which the
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Both courts viewed the results as compelled by their respective
determinations of what was necessary to properly accommodate the
law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press. 102 These two
factors were the same two which had been balanced with different
results in Gertz. 103 The Indiana and Colorado courts chose to be more
protective of the press because they believed that this better en04
couraged free debate, which they viewed as essential to democracy. 1
A corollary to this was their belief that a lesser fault standard would
lead to media self-censorship, and a concomitant lessening of free
debate. 105 While these assumptions may or may not be correct, and it is
doubtful they could ever be tested empirically, the focus of both courts
on the rights of the media, rather than on the rights of the defamed
private person, clearly pointed the way toward the resolution of these
cases. 106
Further justifications were offered by the courts in Aafco and
Walker. Both rejected the reasoning in Gertz that the judiciary should
not decide on an ad hoc basis what is and what is not a matter of public
or general interest or concern. 10 7 Neither court saw any difficulty or
impropriety in making this decision, as other courts had done after
Rosenbloom. 108 Also evident was a distaste for the distinction between
Court formulated in St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968): "There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." The Supreme Court of Colorado
rejected this definition, feeling that "reckless disregard" should be given the meaning
generally attributed to it in tort law, although it did not see fit to provide that meaning.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 184-86 (4th ed.
1971) (wherein "reckless" is used interchangeably with "wilful" and "wanton" to mean
"conduct which is still merely negligent, rather than actually intended to do harm, but
which is so far from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were
so intended." Id. at 184). The net result is a "hybrid standard of liability-Rosenbloom

minus St. Amant." 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 929, 938 (1975).
102. 321 N.E.2d at 587; 188 Colo. at 99, 538 P.2d at 457.
103. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
104. 321 N.E.2d at 586-87; 188 Colo. at 99-100, 538 P.2d at 457-58.
105. 321 N.E.2d at 587; 188 Colo. at 100, 538 P.2d at 458.
106. This is not necessarily meant as criticism of these rationales, for their adoption is
little different from the adoption of contrary rationales by courts choosing negligence
standards. The key is whether the court focuses on the rights of the defamed plaintiff or
the media defendant. See text accompanying notes 55-94 supra. This comment is made
merely to illustrate the policies which underlie the minority result and point out the
difficulty in predicting results in states that have not yet analyzed the question.
107. 321 N.E.2d at 590; 188 Colo. at 101-02, 538 P.2d at 459; see text accompanying
notes 25-26 supra.
108. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Johnston, 448 F.2d 378, 382-83 (4th Cir. 1971); F & J
Enterprises v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (N.D.
Ohio 1974); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 254 So. 2d 386, 389 (Fla. 1971); Mellor v. Scott
Publishing Co., Inc., 10 Wash. App. 645, 657, 519 P.2d 1010, 1018 (1974).
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public and private figures, which the Indiana Court of Appeals characterized as "mak[ing] no sense in terms of our constitutional guarantees
of speech and press."'" Few public persons were thought to have the
access to the media assumed by the Supreme Court in Gertz, nI" and the
effectiveness of that self-help remedy, even if available, was questioned."' Public persons were thought to have assumed the risk of
defamation no more than private persons." 2 The Indiana Court of
Appeals in Aafco also placed some reliance on language in the Indiana
Constitution, 1 3 but its reliance is of such dubious value 1 4 that it is
unlikely to be followed by other state courts.
While similar to the results in Aafco and Walker, the fault standard adopted by the New York Court of Appeals in Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch,Inc. ,115 is sufficiently different to warrant
special note. As stated by the court:
109. 321 N.E.2d at 587. This antagonism toward the distinction between private and
public plaintiffs demonstrates that the focus of Aafco and Walker was on the first
amendment protections of media defendants rather than on the interest of states in
compensating their citizens for injury to reputation. Discrediting the distinction, however, does not favor the adoption of either Rosenbloom or a negligence standard but
rather only militates toward treating all persons alike. Attacking the distinction goes as
much against the reasoning of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), in
which the defamed plaintiff was a public official, and Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), in which the defamed plaintiff was a public figure, as it does against
Gertz.
110. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
111. 321 N.E.2d at 587.
112. Id. at 588; see text accompanying note 29 supra.
113. 321 N.E.2d at 585-86. The relevant portion of the Indiana Constitution provides:
"No law shall be passed, restraining the free interchange of thought and opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write or print, freely on any subject whatever: but for the
abuse of that right, every person shall be responsible." IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 9, reprinted
in Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d
580, 586 n.4 (Ind. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
114. The text of the constitutional provision relied upon by the court in Aafco did not
literally support the court's result, for it covered speech concerning "any subject
whatever" and in no way focused on matters of public or general interest or concern. As
is typical of state constitutional language, it also makes allowances for defamation law
when it notes that "for the abuse of that right [of free speech and a free press], every
person shall be responsible." IND. CONsT. art. 1, § 9. Thus, reliance on this constitutional
provision was wholly misplaced, as the provision may easily be read to support a
contrary result. For a good critique of the technique of relying on state constitutions
which contain language similar to that of the Federal Constitution to reach a result
different than that arrived at in Gertz, see Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56
Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975).
115. 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975). In Chapadeau the
defendant newspaper correctly reported that the plaintiff, a public school teacher, had
been arrested for possession of heroin but, in the same article, erroneously reported that
the plaintiff had been arrested at a party where police found drugs and beer. The plaintiff
brought a libel action.
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We now hold that within the limits imposed by the Supreme

Court where the content of the article is arguably within the
sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably
related to matters warranting public exposition, the party
defamed may recover; however, to warrant such recovery he
must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner without
due consideration for the standards of information gathering
and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible par-

ties."16
This standard resembles Rosenbloom insofar as it imposes a stricter
fault standard upon a plaintiff when the subject matter of the defamation is not purely a private matter. But while Rosenbloom
identified non-private defamation as that "involving matters of public
or general concern, '" 117 Chapadeau identifies it as that "arguably
within the sphere of legitimate public concern, which is reasonably
related to matters warranting public exposition." This may encompass
118
fewer topics than the Rosenbloom standard.
The standard also differs from Rosenbloom in that Rosenbloom,
by incorporating New York Times, required a plaintiff to demonstrate
"6actual malice" 119 with "convincing clarity." 120 Chapadeau, on the
other hand, requires that the plaintiff show "by a preponderance of the
116. Id. 2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64. This standard is unique
-no other state has adopted a similar one in the wake of Gertz. It is interesting to note
that the language from Chapadeau which is quoted in the text is very similar to the
language of Justice Harlan in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967):
We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public official
may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes
substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation
and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers.
Whether the New York Court of Appeals was relying on this language is uncertain
because it makes no citation to Justice Harlan's opinion; however, the similarity in the
language of the two opinions seems more than coincidental. Therefore, the standard in
Chapadeau might be characterized as less strict than the New York Times standard.
(Concurring in Butts, Chief Justice Warren noted that the standard announced by Justice
Harlan was a relaxation of the New York Times standard. 388 U.S. at 163.)
117. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
118. The phrases "legitimate public concern" and "warranting public exposition"
suggest this narrower scope. The term "arguably," however, suggests a broader standard. The New York Court of Appeals gave no guidance on this point other than to imply
that it was not directly following Rosenbloom. 38 N.Y.2d at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571,379
N.Y.S.2d at 64.
119. "Actual malice" was defined in New York Times to mean "in the knowledge
that [the defamatory matter] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true
or not." 376 U.S. at 279-80; see note 9 supra. "Reckless disregard," as defined in St.
Amant v. Thompson, means the publisher "entertained serious doubts as to the truth of
[the] publication." 390 U.S. at 731; see note 101 supra.
120. See note 9 supra.
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evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly irresponsible manner
without due consideration for the standards of information gathering
and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties." This is
a lesser fault standard in that it does not focus upon the publisher's
subjective doubts about the truth of the statement giving rise to the
plaintiff's claim.12 1
121. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727,731 (1968) (construing the "reckless
disregard" language of the New York Times "actual malice" requirement); note 101
supra.
No other jurisdiction has adopted Rosenbloom or a Rosenbloom-like standard. The
Court of Appeals of Arizona attempted to adopt a Rosenbloom-like standard in Peagler
v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976), but was reversed
by the Supreme Court of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977), which opted for a
negligence standard. Two additional cases are also of interest regarding Rosenbloom:
LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1976), and
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 497 (D.D.C. 1976).
The fault standard adopted by the Court of Appeals of Louisiana in LeBoeuf
contained both a New York Times standard and a negligence standard:
For a publication to be actionable as libel it must be shown that the publisher
had knowledge of the falsity or demonstrated reckless disregard of the truth. At
a minimum a publisher must have some knowledge which would place him on
his guard, making him aware that further research was necessary to insure the
veracity of his report. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
327 So. 2d at 431. The first sentence of the LeBoeuf standard paraphrases the New York
Times standard. See note 9 supra. It is applicable only insofar as the defamed plaintiff is
a public figure or a public official, or if the state has elected to follow Rosenbloom and
the subject matter is of public or general interest or concern. Since LeBoeuf did not
involve a public figure or official and the matter was probably one of public interest or
concern (an arrest for murder), it might be argued that by this language the Court of
Appeals of Louisiana had impliedly adopted Rosenbloom after Gertz. This would read
too much into the language, however, for the court did not explicitly consider the fault
standard issue posed by Gertz. Moreover, the second quoted sentence is consistent with
a negligence standard. For this reason the first sentence, then, appears to be no more
than a gratuitous comment by the court. Indeed, a prior decision by the Court of Appeals
of Louisiana had contained language suggesting the adoption of a negligence standard.
See Wilson v. Capital City Press, 315 So. 2d 393, 397-98 (La. App. 1975).
The subject matter of the alleged defamation in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 497 (D.D.C. 1976), was clearly one of public or
general interest or concern-the sponsoring of parties by the plaintiff corporation on
behalf of government contracting officials with whom it dealt. The District Court for the
District of Columbia held that Rosenbloom should govern as a result of the plaintiff's
status as a corporation. The court reasoned that a corporation has no private life, making
the rationales of Gertz inapposite. A corporation should therefore be treated like a public
figure-the latter has "lost claim to his private life" and the former "never has a private
life to lose." 417 F. Supp. at 955. Recovery would thus be allowed only upon meeting the
requirements of the New York Times standard, as developed in Rosenbloom. Id. at 956.
Alternatively, even without considering the inapplicability of the Gertz rationales, the
court noted that this particular corporation was a public figure and should therefore be
held to the New York Times standard regardless of Gertz. Id. at 956-57.
While the reasoning of the district court in MartinMarietta is not wholly illogical, it
creates a distinction unknown at the common law by placing special handicaps on a
corporation as a defamation plaintiff. A corporation cannot, of course, be defamed in the
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Prognosis

There are a number of cases which have addressed the issue of a
media defendant's standard of care but have managed to avoid deciding it. 122 The issue cannot be sidestepped indefinitely, however, and
eventually every state will be forced to address this issue and to adopt a
specific fault standard. This article has demonstrated that these states
have at least two distinct lines of authority from which to choose. It is
believed that most states will follow the majority negligence rule, and
they will be correct in doing so, for the adoption of a negligence
standard is the best alternative for a number of reasons.
Gertz and almost all of the state court decisions construing it have
explicitly stated that the issue at hand was to find the proper accommodation between the competing interests of the freedoms of speech and
press and the protection of reputation served by the law of defamation. 123 In this regard, Gertz held that the interests of the first amendment are adequately protected .by any standard short of strict liability. 124 Because a negligence test is sufficient to protect all federal
constitutional interests, only the existence of additional state interests
on the free speech and free press side of the balance could justify the
adoption of a standard stricter than negligence when private parties are
involved. It is submitted that no such state interests are likely to be
found.
The first amendment is the bulwark protecting the freedoms of
speech and press; rarely, if ever, have state interests stood out as more
protective of these freedoms than the first amendment. There is no
reason to believe that the interests of the states in these freedoms are
more compelling today than they have been in the past. The courts
which have determined that the first amendment alone does not adequately protect the state's own interest in the freedoms of speech and
press have simply created new state interests.
same manner as an individual, but the law protects its business reputation and standing in
the community. W. PROSSER, supra note 101, § 11I, at 745-46. This realization properly
led to the rejection of the reasoning of Martin Marietta in Trans World Accounts, Inc. v.
Associated Press, 425 F. Supp. 814 (N.D. Cal. 1977). In Trans World Accounts, the
district court chose not to follow MartinMarietta not only because California law made

no distinction between personal and corporate reputation, but also because it believed
that the Supreme Court had rejected Rosenbloom in its entirety in Gertz. Id. at 819. The
district court could find no first amendment basis for the distinction made in Martin
Marietta. Id.
122. E.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 538 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1976); Barbetta
Agency, Inc. v. Evening News Publishing Co., 135 N.J. Super. 214,343 A.2d 105 (1975);
Newspaper Publishing Corp. v. Burke, 216 Va. 800, 224 S.E.2d 132 (1976).
123. See text accompanying notes 23-33, 64-79, 102-12 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
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In addition, the rationales put forward by these courts in adopting a
standard stricter than negligence' 25 have not been persuasive. Reliance
on state constitutional language is often inappropriate as state constitutions generally hold the media expressly responsible for abuses of their
freedoms of speech and press found in the first amendment and parallel
state provisions. 2 6 Thus, when courts announce that a reversion to
Rosenbloom is necessary to protect free debate, they are simply
expressing a disagreement with Gertz on an issue that is largely
incapable of empirical proof. While each state court must interpret its
own constitution, and while it is not improper for two courts to
interpret similar language differently, it is disingenuous for a court to
rely on state constitutional language which on its face is more limited
in its protection of free speech and free press than the Federal Constitution. 127
It was also improper for these courts to decide that they should be
in the business of deciding what. is or is not a matter of public or
general interest or concern.1 21 The Supreme Court expressly disapproved of this function in Gertz, 129 and with good reason. There are no
satisfactory tests by which one can decide what is or is not of public or
general interest and attempting to do so on an ad hoc basis can only
result in arbitrary and inconsistent results. The criticism by these
courts of the distinction drawn by the Supreme Court between public
and private persons' 30 may have some theoretical validity, but this
distinction has been firmly engrained into the law of defamation in the
fourteen years since New York Times. It is too late in the day for state
courts to attack this fundamental principle of federal constitutional
law.
Finally, the adoption of a Rosenbloom test, while purporting to
balance the first amendment and the law of defamation, tends to
emphasize the former at the expense of the latter. It is extremely
difficult for a defamed plaintiff to recover under the "New York Times
malice" aspect of the Rosenbloom analysis, because of its emphasis
on subjective elements. 31 While this is appropriate in the case of a
public person or a public official, because he will be more able to
protect his reputation through self-help, the private person has no such
125.
126.
127.
N.E.2d
128.
129.
130.
131.

..See notes 102-12 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 113-14 supra.
E.g., Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publishing Co., 321
580 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
See text accompanying note 107 supra.
See text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
See text accompanying notes 27-29, 109-12 supra.
See notes 9, 101 supra.
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alternate means of protecting his legitimate reputational interests.
Thus, even though the media may have a legitimate interest regarding
matters of public interest or concern, a balancing of interests requires
an equal recognition of the importance of the private individual's
interest. For this reason, states which wish to afford the media more
protection than is available under a traditional negligence standard
should adopt variations on the negligence theme1 32 and not impose the
sugunreasonable burdens of Rosenbloom. The Supreme Court itself
133
gested one such variation in its damage limitation in Gertz.
In summary, the adoption of the majority rule1 34 is the best alternative open to states addressing the issue of a media defendant's standard
of care. A negligence standard gives proper emphasis to the protection
of reputation served by the law of defamation, while at the same time
sufficiently protecting first amendment interests.
I.

ISSUES

UNANSWERED BY GERTZ

As mentioned in part I, the Supreme Court opinion in Gertz left a
number of unanswered questions that will have to be addressed by state
and federal courts. Unresolved constitutional issues center on the
scope of Gertz: Is Gertz limited to media defendants or does it also
extend to non-media defendents? Is Gertz limited to libel, or does it
extend to other forms of defamation? The adoption by states of fault
standards requires the resolution of more diverse problems: Is Gertz
limited to matters of public or general interest or concern? What
burden of proof must a plaintiff meet under the state standard of care?
Has falsity become an element of the plaintiff's case? How have state
defamation statutes been affected by Gertz?
A.

Is Gertz Limited to Media Defendants?

Gertz was a libel action concerning a media defendant; most
litigation has similarly involved mass media defendants, particularly
132. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
133. See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
134. The mere fact that negligence has become the standard for a majority of juris-

dictions militates for its adoption in future cases in order to achieve uniformity in the
law. One might argue that the Supreme Court itself did not contemplate uniform reactions to Gertz, since it expressly left adoption of fault standards to the states. However,
the Court had to leave the states this leeway in order to avoid overreaching into matters
of state concern. The Court's function in Gertz was simply to state what minimums were
necessary to protect the interests of the Federal Constitution. The other half of the
balance, the law of defamation, is a matter of state law, and the Court correctly left its
delineation to the states. If the language of the Gertz court contemplates any standard,
that standard is negligence. See note 37 supra.
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newspapers. 13 5 Others, of course, can commit the tort of defamation.13 6 The question therefore arises whether Gertz extends to all
defendants or just to media defendants.
The Court's opinion in Gertz does not expressly address this issue.
The opinion speaks solely in terms of media defendants. In phrasing
the issue in Gertz, the Court spoke of "whether a newspaper or
broadcaster" is entitled to claim a constitutional privilege, 13 7 and the
holding speaks in terms of "a publisher or broadcaster.""13 In addition, the opinion contains no dictum on whether its rationales extend
beyond the media context; thus, Gertz provides no direct support for
applying its holding to non-media defendants.
Since Gertz, almost every case to address the fault standard issue
has involved a media defendant. Only two states have considered the
problem of Gertz' application to the non-media defendant. Maryland
has applied Gertz to all defendants, while Wisconsin has declined to
extend Gertz to non-media defendants. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
reached its result in Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf,139 a slander action
brought by a private individual against his former employer. The
plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure, the subject
matter of the defamation was not a matter of public or general interest
or concern, and the defendant was not a member of the media. 140 The
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland had held that Gertz did not
extend to the defamation of a private individual concerning purely
135. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976); Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309,560 P.2d 1216(1977);
Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975); Troman v. Wood, 62111. 2d 184,340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air

Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind.App. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76
(1975); LeBoeuf v. Times Picayune Publishing Corp., 327 So. 2d 430 (La. App. 1976);
Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1976); Chapadeau v.
Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105,334 N.E.2d

494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
136. Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975);

Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976). Defamation by radio and television

broadcast may be seen as libel or as slander or as a type of defamation apart from both
libel and slander. Courts tend to muddle or ignore this question, perhaps because any
real distinction between libel and slander bears only on the historical origins of the
dichotomy. W. PROSSER, supra note 101, § 112, at 753-54.
137. 418 U.S. at 332; see text accompanying note 18 supra.
138. Id. at 347; see text accompanying note 33 supra.

139. 276 Md. 580,350 A.2d 688 (1976). For a brief summary of the facts in Jacron, see
note 51 supra.
140. 276 Md. at 582-83, 350 A.2d at 689-90.
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private matters.14 1 Although it affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals of Maryland concluded that
Gertz should be read as a rejection of the Rosenbloom subject matter
test, on grounds that it failed to adequately recognize a state's interest
in the protection of its citizens' reputations. 142 The court noted that
New York Times had not been limited to media defendants; rather its
focus had been on the exercise of first amendment rights, not on the
person or entity exercising them. 14 3 Not only could the Maryland court
see no distinction drawn between types of defendants in the Supreme
Court cases, it also could not
discern any persuasive basis for distinguishing media and
non-media cases. The rationale for the application of a
constitutional privilege in New York Times, Curtis and Gertz
is that the defense of truth is not alone sufficient to assure
free and open discussion of important issues. Issues of public interest may equally be discussed in media and non-media
contexts, and the need for a constitutional privilege, therefore, obtains in either case. . . . The proposition that the
press enjoys greater rights than members of the public generally was rejected by the Supreme Court in Pell v.
Procunier.144
For these reasons, the Court found that Jacron Sales Company fell
within the protection of Gertz. 145 Since Gertz allowed any standard
other than strict liability, the Maryland court announced that it would
impose the Restatement (Second) of Torts standard 146 to cases of
unprivileged defamation. 147 Yet because Jacron Sales Company
raised a common law conditional privilege for the communication of
information concerning an individual from his former employer to a
new or prospective employer, 141 it could only be held responsible upon
141. Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975), aff'd on other
grounds, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
142. 276 Md. at 588-90, 350 A.2d 693-94. The Maryland court's reading of Gertz has
been confirmed by the Supreme Court. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-57
(1976).
143. 276 Md. at 591-92, 350 A.2d at 694-95.
144. Id. at 592, 350 A.2d at 695 (citation omitted).
In Pell, prison inmates and professional journalists argued that members of the press
had a constitutional right to interview inmates of a state correctional system despite a
prison regulation prohibiting such contacts. The court responded: "Newsmen have no
constitutional right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general
public." Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
145. 276 Md. at 594, 350 A.2d at 696.
146. See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
147. 276 Md. at 594-97, 350 A.2d at 696-98 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 580B (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975)).
148. Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 67-69,341 A.2d 856, 865-67 (1975),
aff'd on other grounds, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
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1 49
a showing of express or actual malice.
In addition to the above analysis, the Maryland court offered
several policy rationales for its extension of Gertz.
"Regardless of constitutional strictures, it would be a bizarre
result as a matter of tort law to hold individual defendants
liable without fault while the media were liable only for
negligence. The standard tort rationale for strict liability is
that it serves to spread the cost of injury over all users of a
given product; in short, it is a theory of enterprise liability.
Further, an individual's defamatory statement is, on the
whole, likely to create a smaller risk of harm than a media
publication. Finally, the media are more likely to be aware of
the risk of liability, and thus more likely to insure against
it. ...."ISO

In addition, the court found substantively identical policy considerations in a comment to section 580B of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 151

Unlike the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has refused to extend Gertz to defamation actions against
149. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580,597-600,350 A.2d 688,698-700(1976).
By "express or actual malice" the Maryland court was not requiring New York Times
"actual malice." See note 9 supra. Rather, it defined "malice" as 'a reckless disregard
of truth, the use of unnecessarily abusive language, or other circumstances which would
support a conclusion that the defendant acted in an ill-tempered manner or was
motivated by ill-will."' 276 Md. at 599--600, 350 A.2d at 699 (quoting Stevenson v.
Baltimore Club, 250 Md. 482, 286-87, 243 A.2d 533, 536 (1968)).
150. 276 Md. at 592-93, 350 A.2d at 695 (quoting The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88
HARV. L. REV. 41, 148 n.52 (1974)).
151.

276 Md. at 593-94, 350 A.2d at 696 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TORTS §

580B, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975)):
"mhe protection of the First Amendment extends to freedom of speech as
well as to freedom of the press, and the interests which must be balanced to
obtain a proper accommodation are similar. It would seem strange to hold that
the press, composed of professionals and causing much greater damage because of the wider distribution of the communication, can constitutionally be
held liable only for negligence, but that a private person, engaged in a casual
private conversation with a single person, can be held liable at his peril if the
statement turns out to be false, without any regard to his lack of fault .. .
This comment now appears in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment e
(1977). See generally text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.
The analysis of Jacron was subsequently reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland in General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976). In
Piskor, an employee brought actions for slander, libel, and false imprisonment against
his corporate employer after the defendant's security guards had barred the plaintiff
from leaving the defendant's plant and had taken the plaintiff to a guardroom on
suspicion of theft. Piskor's detention and questioning in the glass-enclosed guardroom
were observed by his fellow employees, thereby giving rise to his claims in libel and
slander. The court of appeals reversed an award of actual and punitive damages and
remanded the case for determination of the issue of whether abuse by excessive
communication defeated the existence of any common law conditional privilege in the
defendant.
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15 2
non-media defendants. The facts of Calero v. Del Chemical Corp.
were substantively identical to those in Jacron: a private individual
brought an action in libel and slander against his former employer
concerning a matter not of public or general interest or concern. 153 The
Wisconsin court viewed the New York Times-Rosenbloom-Gertz line
of cases as implementing a conditional privilege based on "fundamental First Amendment considerations that arise from the danger [to the
self-governed] of media self-censorship and. . . the need to purge the
'obsolete doctrine that the governed must not criticize their governors. . . .' "154 A constitutionally protected conditional privilege
arose to protect "matter[s] of public concern" 155 in self-government
and extended to "newspapers, television and radio, or comments made
about public officers or public figures." 156 The Wisconsin court did not
view the case as involving first amendment concerns:
In the instant case, we are not dealing with a conditional
privilege based on first amendment principles but rather with
one based on a public policy favoring the encouragement of a
free interchange of information under certain circumstances.
The circumstances are the inquiry by a prospective employer
of a former employer. In such a case, one must prove only
'express malice' which is a defamatory statement motivated
by ill will, spite, envy, revenge, or other bad or corrupt
motives. . . and such express malice must be shown by the
preponderance of the evidence. In the case before us there is
no matter of general or public interest; there is no public
official or public figure; there is no involvement of the
media, either broadcast or print. It is thus different than the
issues raised involving an alderman running for
mayor .... 157
Notwithstanding the absence of a first amendment privilege, the court
held that the defendants' communications to the plaintiff's prospective
employers fell within the common law privilege, and conditioned the
158
recovery of punitive damages upon a showing of "express malice."
152. 68 Wis. 2d 487, 228 N.W.2d 737 (1975).
153. The plaintiff alleged that his former employer and its representative had
communicated defamatory oral and written statements to prospective employers. The
sole issue before the Supreme Court of Wisconsin was the quantum of proof necessary

for the recovery of punitive damages in a purely private context. Id. at 489-96, 228
N.W.2d at 739-43.
154. Id. at 502, 228 N.W.2d at 746 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
155. 68 Wis. 2d at 501, 228 N.W.2d at 745.
156. Id. 2d at 500, 228 N.W.2d at 745.
157. Id. at 506, 228 N.W.2d at 748.
158. Id. at 504, 228 N.W.2d at 747. See text accompanying note 157 supra.
Several other cases have tangentially touched on this question. In Roemer v. Retail
Credit Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 119 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1975), the court dealt with defamation
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Until the Supreme Court decides whether to extend Gertz to nonmedia defendants, state courts are left with the choice faced by the
courts in Jacron and Calero: they can either extend the protections of
the first amendment to all defendants or limit those protections to
media defendants. It is submitted that the rationales underlying Gertz
and the first amendment, as well as logic, favor the former course.
The Jacron court was correct in recognizing that although Gertz is
not literally applicable to non-media defendants, its rationales, as well
as those of all of the Supreme Court's defamation decisions since New
York Times, are applicable to media and non-media defendants alike.
Gertz attempted to strike a balance between the states' interest in
compensating injury to reputation, and the first amendment interests in
free expression.159 The states' interest is necessarily the same regardless of the nature of the defendant. If first amendment concerns on the
other side of the balance are equivalent for both the media and the nonmedia, then Gertz should extend to the non-media context. First
amendment concerns are equivalent in both contexts. By its very
language 1' 6 the first amendment applies to both "speech" and
"press." While most decisions of the Supreme Court have involved
media defendants, the Court has not always drawn a sharp distinction
between media and non-media cases. 16 1 Finally, the court in Jacron
contained in a credit report. The court analyzed Gertz, id. at 932, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 85-86,
but held it inapplicable because of the commercial nature of the credit report. The court
held that credit reports obtained no protection from the first amendment so that the
defendant was not protected by Gertz. Id. at 934, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 87. Because the
fundamental premise of this case was rejected in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), it does not aid in evaluating the
applicability of Gertz beyond the media context. The Court of Appeals of Indiana faced
this issue in Patten v. Smith, 360 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. App. 1977), but simply relied on its
prior adoption of Rosenbloom via Gertz in Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v.
Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974), to require a New York
Times standard of liability in a defamation action arising from random mailings of a trade
association brochure, which the court regarded as a publication whose informational
content was a matter of public or general interest or concern.
159. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
160. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
161. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-57 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347-48 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29,
50-52, 57, 60-62 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730-32 (1968) Time, Inc.
v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-91 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-83 (1964).
Outside the defamation context the Court has not limited first amendment protection
to members of the media. See, e.g., City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm., 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (non-union public school
teacher's reading of petition entitled to first amendment protections); Tinker v. Des
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properly noted the anomaly that would result if Gertz were limited to
media defendants. The media, unlike private individuals, are likely to
be knowledgeable in the law of defamation and cognizant of the need
for care in presenting reports. It would be anomalous indeed if the
media, whose defamation can cause widespread harm, have to be at
least negligent in order to be held liable, while the unaware private
citizen can be held strictly liable for a much lesser harm. Neither
policy nor reason require such a result.
B. Does Gertz Apply Only to Libel?
Since defamation by the media will usually be analyzed as libel, 162 the
question whether Gertz is limited to libel or extends to all forms of
defamation is quite similar to the question of its applicability to nonmedia defendants. While both media and non-media defendants can
commit libel, generally only non-media persons will commit slander.
Still, the question is distinct from the media versus non-media question.
Gertz does not address this question. The Court's discussion
focused on statements made by the press and the broadcast mediamatters traditionally regarded as libelous if defamatory-and the Court
expressed no views on non-libelous forms of defamation. Similarly,
almost all state court cases addressing Gertz have involved libel or
163
defamatory matter which has traditionally been regarded as libel.
The only state court to address the issue has been the Court of
Appeals of Maryland. In Jacron, the Maryland court held that Gertz
applied to slander as well as to libel. 164 Unfortunately, the court's
analysis of this issue was inextricably entwined with its analysis of
whether Gertz extended to non-media defendants.165 While recognizing that the two questions were distinct, the court did not give separate
166
reasons for its conclusions.
Nevertheless, the Maryland court's conclusion that Gertz should
extend to all forms of defamation is sound. The arguments supporting
this conclusion are essentially those which would extend Gertz to nonmedia defendants. 167 The distinction between libel and slander is
Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (students wearing armbands and not interfering with school discipline entitled to first amendment protections).
162. See notes 135-36 supra and accompanying text.
163. See notes 135-36 supra.
164. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 594, 350 A.2d 688, 696 (1976).
165. See notes 142-51 supra and accompanying text.
166. 276 Md. at 590-94, 350 A.2d at 694-96.
167. See notes 142-51, 159-61 supra and accompanying text.
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largely historical and has little basis in either policy or logic.168 The
interests balanced in Gertz, reputation and free expression, do not vary
from libel to slander. The first amendment does not distinguish spoken
from written expression. To limit Gertz to libel would be as anomalous
as limiting it to media defendants; it would also further complicate this
area of the law. While the common law developed a distinction
between libel and slander, 169 the issue whether to extend Gertz to all
forms of defamation is a matter of federal constitutional law, and there
is simply no constitutional basis for differentiating between written and
spoken defamation.
C.

Is Gertz Limited to Matters of Public Interest?

Since the Supreme Court in Gertz expressly rejected Rosenbloom's subject matter test in favor of a status-of-the-plaintiff test, 170 it
may seem odd to ask whether Gertz applies only in cases where the
subject matter of the defamation-is a matter of public or general interest
or concern. Yet some courts have so limited its applicability. For
example, in Jacronthe Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that
Gertz applied only to matters of public interest or concern. Purely
private defamation actions-that is, defamations involving a private
plaintiff and a matter not of public or general interest-were to be
resolved under the common law. 17 1 However, most courts, including
the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Jacron,172 have rejected this
limitation on Gertz' applicability and have held that the application of
Gertz is to be determined without regard to the subject matter of the
defamation. 173 A number of courts have suggested a similar result, but
since the defamation at issue was a matter of public interest, these
courts did not expressly state what course they would follow if the
defamation at issue involved a purely private matter.174 Other courts
168.
169.
170.
171.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 112, at 764 (4th ed. 1971).
Id. § 112, at 751-52.
See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
Sindorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md. App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975), aff'don other

grounds, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); accord, General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 27
Md. App. 95, 101, 340 A.2d 767, 773 (1975), rev'd on othergrounds, 277 Md. 165, 352
A.2d 810 (1976). The opinions of the Court of Special Appeals in Jacron and Piskorwere

announced before the Court of Appeals of Maryland announced its opinion in Jacron.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin implicitly reached the same result. Calero v. Del
Chemical Corp., 68 Wis. 2d 487, 504-07, 228 N.W.2d 737, 745-48 (1975).
172. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-90, 350 A.2d 688, 690-94 (1976).
173. E.g., Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975); Stone v. Essex
County Newspapers, Inc., 330 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 1975).
174. See, e.g., Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975);
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 112, 334
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have limited the language of their decisions to matters of public or
general interest or concern and have given no intimation as to the result
175
for a purely private defamation.
The issue of whether Gertz applies only in cases involving matters
of public or general interest or concern should not be confused with the
question of whether a state will adopt a Rosenbloom-like standard in
the wake of Gertz. 176 Those state courts which have elected to follow
Rosenbloom necessarily had before them a defamation concerning a
matter of public or general interest, 177 the essential element of Rosenbloom. Where a court is faced with a case involving a purely private
matter, however, Rosenbloom would not require the New York Times
standard; the only issue would be whether to involve the Gertz proscription against strict liability (and its limit on damages). 178 Most
courts have said or implied that Gertz will apply in this situation.
Gertz itself implicitly supports this result. As already discussed, Gertz
rejected the subject matter test of Rosenbloom in favor of a status-ofthe-plaintiff approach. 179 In this way the Court held that first amendment interests are best protected by focusing on the status of the
defamed party. 180 It is contrary to both logic and the Court's analysis to
re-employ a subject matter test to determine the scope of the announced rule. For this reason, Gertz should be applied to matters of
18 1
purely private interest as well as those of public concern.
D.

What Burden of ProofMust a PlaintiffMeet?

In Gertz, the Supreme Court did not discuss burden of proof. Nor
does the issue relate directly to any of the factors weighed in Gertz. If
N.E.2d 494, 500 (Krenzler, J., concurring), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v.
Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976).
175. See, e.g., Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439,546 P.2d 81 (1976).
176. See notes 95-121 supra and accompanying text.
177. See notes 97, 98, 115, 121 supra.
178. Implicit in Rosenbloom was the notion that if the subject matter of the defamation is not a matter of public or general interest or concern, then the New York Times
standard would be inapplicable, and the common law would determine whether, and to
what extent, the defendant would be held liable. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. at 40-44, 44 n.12 (1971). See also text accompanying note 171 supra.
179. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
180. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-46 (1974).
181. This resolution of the question becomes more complicated in states which have
applied a Rosenbloom analysis. Cases involving private plaintiffs are divided into those
that raise matters of public concern, and those which involve purely private matters.
Under Rosenbloom, the first group is governed by "New York Times malice," which is
permissible under Gertz because it exceeds strict liability. See text accompanying note
33 supra. Because the second group does not include matters of public interest or
concern, Rosenbloom would not require any special standard; but, Gertz would still
require more than common law strict liability.
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the Supreme Court considered this problem at all, it probably meant to
include burden of proof within the latitude given the states to determine their own standard of care. Insofar as burden of proof is a
necessary element of a fault standard, the Court has impliedly left the
matter to the states.
1. Negligence Jurisdictions
In states adopting a negligence standard,18 2 consistency would
require that the defamed plaintiff demonstrate the defendant's negligence by a preponderance of the evidence as in other negligence
183
contexts.
Only a few courts have explicitly considered the issue of a private
plaintiff's burden of proof. In Jacron, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that negligence must be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence. 184 It viewed a clear and convincing burden as a function of
Rosenbloom and New York Times,185 a combination which it had
rejected. 186 According to the Maryland court, a preponderance of the
evidence burden "is the quantum of proof ordinarily required in other
types of actions for negligence, and is apt to be more readily understood by juries."1 87 Citing Jacron, the Supreme Court of Arizona also
adopted a preponderance test.188 By rejecting the Rosenbloom-New
York Times combination with its "rigorous" burden of proof and
instead adopting a negligence standard, the Supreme Court of Illinois
189
has impliedly adopted a preponderance of the evidence burden.
Finally, the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have noted
that it is "doubtful" that the clear and convincing proof standard will
be imposed after Gertz. 190
2.

Rosenbloom Jurisdictions

In states adopting a Rosenbloom-like standard, 191 the burden of
proof question arises in two contexts. The first concerns a case in
which the subject matter of the defamation is not one of public or
general interest or concern. Since no court in a Rosenbloom-like
182. See text accompanying notes 39-94 supra.
183. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 168, § 38, at 208-11.
184. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597, 350 A.2d 688, 698 (1976).

185. See note 9 supra; text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
186.
187.
188.
(1977).
189.

276 Md. at 580, 350 A.2d at 698.
Id.
Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 315, 560 P.2d 1216, 1222
(The Arizona court cited to the incorrect page in the Jacron opinion.)
See Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975).
190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment j (1977).
191. See notes 95-121 supra and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction has been faced with this situation, 192 it is difficult to
speculate on the burden of proof that will'be adopted, because the fault
standard itself is unclear. For example, if a negligence standard is
adopted for cases not concerning matters of public interest or
concern, 193 then a preponderance of the evidence burden of proof
would likely be adopted. 194 On the other hand, if in these cases the

standard approaches Rosenbloom, and becomes more strict, the plaintiff's burden may correspondingly approach the "convincing clarity."

195

burden, discussed below.

The second situation arises in a case like Rosenbloom, where the
subject matter of the defamation is a matter of public or general interest
or concern. In this situation Rosenbloom incorporates the New York
Times burden of proof: the plaintiff must demonstrate with convincing
clarity that the defendant acted with "actual malice."' 196 If, after
Gertz, a state simply adopts Rosenbloom, it typically also adopts a
convincing clarity burden of proof. This was the approach of the
Supreme Court of Colorado' 97 and the Court of Appeals of Indiana, 198
and, to a limited extent, of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. 199
192. See notes 176-81 supra and accompanying text.
193. See note 178 supra.
194. See text accompanying notes 182-90 supra.
195. See note 9 supra;text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
196. Rosenbloom v.Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971); see note 9 supra;text
accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
197. Walker v.Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 118 Colo. 86, 101,538 P.2d 450,459, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975). The Colorado court slightly modified the fault standard of
Rosenbloom, see note 101 supra and accompanying text, but retained itsconvincing
clarity burden of proof.
198. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580, 588-89 (Ind. App. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
199. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 417 F. Supp. 947
(D.D.C. 1976); see note 121 supra.
Some courts have neither adopted a negligence standard nor totally followed Rosenbloom. See notes 115-21 supra and accompanying text. For example, although it was
later reversed on this issue, the Court of Appeals of Arizona responded to Gertz by
reverting to its pre-New York Times common law malice standard, and also re-adopted
its prior burden of proof-clear and convincing evidence. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 26 Ariz. App. 274, 547 P.2d 1074 (1976), rev'd, 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216
(1977). While phrased differently, this would seem to be essentially the same burden as
convincing clarity. See id. at 281-82, 547 P.2d at 1081-82. The New York Court of
Appeals adopted a fault standard resembling Rosenbloom, though less strict. Chapadeau
v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975); see notes 116-21 supra and accompanying text. In formulating its rule, however,
the court explicitly held that the new standard need only be showvn by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. at 199, 341 N.E.2d at 571, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 64; see text accompanying
notes 116, 121 supra.
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3.

Conclusion

There is no clearly "correct" response to the burden of proof
question. Burden of proof is one means by which state courts can take
advantage of the leeway the Supreme Court provided in Gertz to adjust
the difficulty of the plaintiff's case to satisfy state interests. A court
can ease a strict standard of liability by choosing a less demanding
burden of proof; or it can afford the defendant some relief under a less
strict standard by increasing the plaintiff's burden. Perhaps an interest
in avoiding undue complication of an area of law which is already
complicated militates in favor of adoptinga preponderance standard in
negligence states.
E. Has Falsity Become an Element
of the Plaintiff's Case?
Under the orthodox view of the law of defamation falsity is not an
element of the plaintiff's claim for relief.20 0 A plaintiff need only show
that the statement complained of was defamatory; 20 ' its falsity enters
the case by way of the defendant's affirmative defense of truth.20 2
Gertz, however, has raised the question of whether falsity has become
an element of the plaintiff's case. 20 3 In phrasing both the issue and the
holding the Court spoke of "defamatory falsehood[s]. "204 At least two
interpretations of these words are possible. One is that the Court
simply made the mistake made by many courts and assumed that
"defamatory" is necessarily synonymous with "false," making "defamatory falsehood" redundant. Such a misstatement of the common
law20 5 seems unlikely. A more plausible reading is that the Court
intentionally made falsity an element of the tort of defamation. Further
analysis of the opinion supports this conclusion.
The constitutional minimum in Gertz requires a plaintiff to demonstrate, at the very least, that the defendant acted negligently. One may
ask, "Negligent with regard to what?" The logical response must be,
"Negligent as to whether the statement complained of was true or
false." In Gertz, the Court recognized the need to permit some false
200. W. PROSSER, supra note 168, § 116, at 796-99.
201. "Defamatory" refers to "that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popular
sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in which the plaintiff is
held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings or opinions'against him. It
Id. § 111, at 739. Thus, a true statement
necessarily involves the idea of disgrace .
could be defamatory.
202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613, Caveat, Comment j (1977).
203. Id.

204. 418 U.S. at 332, 347; see text accompanying note 18 supra.
205. See note 201 supra.
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statements as a necessary concomitant of free debate. The Court
reasoned that a rule of strict liability would compel a publisher or
broadcaster to guarantee the accuracy (or truth) of his statements and
would necessarily result in media self-censorship. 20 6 " 'Allowance of
the defense of truth, with the burden of proving it on the defendant,
does not mean that only false speech will be deterred.' " 207 Therefore,
a fair reading of the Court's opinion in Gertz reveals that in all
defamation cases in which first amendment considerations arise, it is
impermissible to put the burden of proving truth on the defendant.
Rather, the burden of proving the falsity of the allegedly defamatory
20 8
statement rests with the plaintiff.
State courts have generally ignored this problem. The only court to
explicitly discuss it was again the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 9 In
Jacron the court concluded: "[T]ruth is no longer an affirmative
defense to be established by the defendant, but instead the burden of
proving falsity rests upon the plaintiff, since under this standard, he is
already required to establish negligence with respect to such falsity. "210 This proposition should similarly hold for non-negligence jurisdictions, so that falsity becomes part of showing "actual malice" or
other standard of liability. The Supreme Court of Illinois has also
included falsity as an element of the plaintiff's case, but without
discussing its reason for doing so. 2 11 Similarly, the Supreme Court of
Arizona included falsity as an element of the plaintiff's case but did so
without any analysis of Gertz.212 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma
seems to have reached a contrary result, but in the case in question it
did not fully consider the implications of Gertz and therefore is not
persuasive authority contradicting the conclusion that falsity has become an element of the plaintiff's case.2 13
The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts have stated that
206. 418 U.S. at 340.
207. Id. at 340-41. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279
(1964)).
208. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 497 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (truth is a constitutional defense necessarily implied from the holding in Gertz).
209. Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976).
210. Id. at 597, 350 A.2d at 698.
211. Troman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 198, 340 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1975).
212. Peagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 309, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977).
213. Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 94 (Okla. 1976). The court held
that there was no reversible error in a jury instruction which placed the burden of
proving truth on the defendant. The court was only discussing the phrasing of the
instruction as it related to that burden. It did not consider the propriety of such a burden.
It assumed that the burden was proper and held that the instruction adequately reflected
it.
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they express no opinion on the extent to which the common
law rule of placing on the defendant the burden of proof to
show the truth of the defamatory communication has been
changed by the constitutional requirement that the plaintiff
must prove the defendant's negligence or214greater fault regarding the falsity of the communication.
The Restatement (Second) does, however, eliminate from the section
on burden of proof the provision placing the burden of proving truth on
the defendant, and adds a provision requiring the plaintiff to show "the
defendant's negligence, reckless disregard or knowledge regarding the
truth or falsity and the defamatory character of the communication
...
215 In addition, the Restatement (Second) removes the provision for the defense of truth from the "Defenses to Actions for
Defamation" chapter and replaces it with a new provision in its
chapter on "Invasions of Interest in Reputation," which is worded
quite generally, without reference to parties, defenses, or burdens of
proof: "One who publishes a defamatory statement of fact is not
subject to liability for defamation if the statement is true.,"216 Still, the
drafters of the Restatement (Second) did not see fit to require a
showing of falsity as a necessary ingredient for a cause of action in
defamation. 217 Rather, in their comments they stated that since a
plaintiff is required to show some degree of fault on the part of the
defendant, 218 the plaintiff must necessarily demonstrate the falsity of
the defamatory communication:
The burden of proof of showing fault is undoubtedly upon
the plaintiff. If the plaintiff has the burden of showing that
the defendant was negligent in failing to ascertain the falsity
or the defamatory character of the statement, or that he
acted recklessly or knowingly in this regard, there remains
little, if any, significance in the common law position that
truth of the statement is a defense to be raised by the defendant and on which he had the burden of proof.

.

.

. As a

practical matter, in order to meet the constitutional obligation of showing defendant's fault as to truth or falsity, the
plaintiff will necessarily find that
9 must show the falsity of
2 1 he
the defamatory communication.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613, Caveat (1977).
215. Id. § 613(I)(g). Compare RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 613(1), (2)(a) (1938) with
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 613 (1)(g), (2) (1977).

214.
216.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A

(1977). Compare RESTATEMENT

TORTS § 582 (1938) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 581A, 582 (1977).
217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).

218. Id.at § 558(c).
219. Id. § 580B, Comment j; accord, id. § 613, Comment j.
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Therefore, although the Restatement (Second) does not formally make
the demonstration of falsity an element of the plaintiff's case, the
drafters have done so indirectly through their comments and by removing truth as an element of the defendant's case. In so doing, they have
followed what has been shown to be a fair reading of Gertz-that
falsity is an element of the plaintiff's case.
F. Effect on State Defamation Statutes
The law of defamation is almost exclusively a creature of the
common law; a few states have, however, codified part of the law of
defamation.22 The question facing the courts of these states is how
Gertz has affected their constitutionality. In Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc. ,221 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held several statutory
provisions unconstitutional under Gertz because they provided for a
presumption of malice from the publication of injurious matter for
which no justification could be shown and they required the plaintiff to
show only that the defendant had published the allegedly defamatory
statement. 2 Martin is the only decision which has addressed this
question, but statutes in other states appear equally vulnerable to
constitutional challenge under Gertz. 21
220. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2739 (Page 1954 & Supp. 1976); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1581-84a (Purdon 1953 & Cum. Annual Pocket Part 1977-78).
221. 549 P.2d 85, 90 (Okla. 1976).
222. Id. Section 1445 was held to be unconstitutional:

An injurious publication is presumed to have been malicious if no justifiable
motive for making it is shown.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1445 (1961). Portions of § 1443, concerning privileged

communications, and § 1444, concerning the plaintiff's burden of proof and the defendant's defenses, were also held to be unconstitutional:

In all cases of publication of matter not privileged under this section, malice
shall be presumed from the publication, unless the fact and the testimony rebut
the same ...

Id. § 1443.
In all civil actions for libel or slander, it shall be sufficient to state generally
what the defamatory matter was, and that it was published or spoken of the
plaintiff, and to allege any general or special damage caused thereby, and the

plaintiff to recover shall only be held to prove that the matter was publishedor
spoken by the defendant concerning the plaintiff....
Id. § 1444 (emphasis added) (emphasized portion held to be unconstitutional).
The relevant portions of the above sections were reprinted by the Oklahoma court in
Martin v. Griffin Television, Inc., 549 P.2d 85, 90 (Okla. 1976).

223. In light of the foregoing discussion regarding falsity becoming part of the
plaintiff's case after Gertz, see text accompanying notes 200-19 supra, the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania statute, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1584a (Purdon Cum. Annual
Pocket Part 1977-78) (which codifies verbatim the burden of proof requirements of
Restatement of Torts § 613 (1938)), is suspect. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1444

(1961). Constitutional challenges may also be raised against the Ohio statute, OHIO REV.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Supreme Court once again
struggled to accommodate the competing interests of the law of defamation and the first amendment. The effect of Gertz has been to shift
the focal point of one aspect of this struggle from the Supreme Court to
the state courts.
A majority of state courts have responded to the Court's invitation
in Gertz by adopting a negligence standard; a minority of jurisdictions
have adopted a Rosenbloom-like standard, which involves a stricter
test in certain cases. Regardless of what kind of fault standard a
jurisdiction adopts, attention must be paid to the issues not expressly
answered by the Court in Gertz. Gertz's applicability is far-reaching
and should not be limited to cases involving media defendants, defamation in the form of libel, or cases in which the subject matter of the
defamation is a matter of public or general interest or concern. As in
their selection of a standard of care, state courts have much leeway in
the burden of proof they place on a plaintiff. They can match a fault
standard with a burden of proof or temper a standard by a greater or
lesser burden. 224 In addition, Gertz has made proof of falsity an
element of the plaintiff's case in all defamation suits. The effect of this
on state statutes may be substantial depending upon the degree to
which, and manner in which, a state has codified its law of defamation.
It is difficult to predict whether Gertz will achieve a "proper"
accommodation between the competing interests of reputation and
freedom of expression. But Gertz has left the states with no choice but
to consider the impact of state-protected interests on this problem.
Although the analysis outlined in this article suggests that it is unnecessary, it is anticipated that state courts will struggle for many years to
respond to the revolutionary mandate of Gertz.
CODE ANN. § 2739.01 (Page 1954), which requires a plaintiff in an action for libel or
slander only to show "that the defamatory matter was published or spoken of him," and
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.02 (Page 1954), in which the burden of proof is placed on
the defendant. Curiously, one judge of the Court of Appeals of Ohio has noted that the

provisions of Ohio Revised Code ch. 2739 "are not applicable to the holding of Gertz."
Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc. v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 117 n.9,

334 N.E.2d 494, 502 n.9 (1974) (Krenzler, J., concurring), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883
(1975).
224. For example, state courts could combine a Rosenbloom-like standard with a
preponderance of the evidence burden. See, e.g., Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dis-

patch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 341 N.E.2d 569, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61 (1975); notes 116-21 supra
and accompanying text.

